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ABSTRACT
We introduce a newmalware detector – Shape-GD – that aggregates
per-machine detectors into a robust global detector. Shape-GD is
based on two insights: 1. Structural: actions such as visiting a website
(waterhole attack) or membership in a shared email thread (phishing
attack) by nodes correlate well with malware spread, and create dy-
namic neighborhoods of nodes that were exposed to the same attack
vector. However, neighborhoods vary unpredictably and require ag-
gregating an unpredictable number of local detectors’ outputs into a
global alert. 2. Statistical: feature vectors corresponding to true and
false positives of local detectors have markedly different conditional
distributions – i.e. their shapes differ. We show that the shape of
neighborhoods can identify infected neighborhoods without having
to estimate the number of local detectors in the neighborhood.
We evaluate Shape-GD by emulating a large community of Win-
dows systems – using system call traces from a few thousand mal-
ware and benign applications – and simulating a waterhole attack
through a popular website and a phishing attack in a corporate
email network. In both these scenarios, we show that Shape-GD
detects malware early (∼100 infected nodes in a ∼100K node system
for waterhole and ∼10 of 1000 for phishing) and robust (with ∼100%
global true positive and ∼1% global false positive rates). At such
early stages of infection, existing algorithms that cluster feature
vectors are ineffective (have an AUC metric of close to 0.5), and
others that count the fraction of alert-generating local detectors
require (the weakly correlated) neighborhoods’ sizes to be estimated
to within 1% accuracy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Behavioral detectors are a crucial line of defense against malware.
By extracting features out of network packets [37, 57, 63, 74], system
calls [25, 36, 51], instruction set [28, 40], and hardware [31, 44, 65]
level actions, behavioral detectors trainmachine learning algorithms
to classify program binaries and executions as either malicious or
benign. In practice, behavioral detectors are deployed extensively
as per-machine local detectors whose alerts are analyzed by global
detectors [2, 3, 9, 10, 13, 33].
However, behavioral detectors are weak – i.e., have high false
positives and negatives. This is because a large class of malware
includes benign-looking behaviors, such as encrypting users’ data,
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Figure 1: (L to R) Each circle is a node that runs a local mal-
ware detector (LD). Our goal is to create a robust global detec-
tor (GD) fromweak LDs.We observe that nodes naturally form
neighborhoods based on attributes relevant to attack vectors
– e.g., all client devices that visit a website W within the last
hour belong to neighborhoodNBw , or all users who received an
email from a mailing list M in the last hour belong to neigh-
borhood NBm . We propose a new GD that groups together sus-
picious local feature vectors based on neighborhoods – tradi-
tional GDs only analyze local alerts while we re-analyze fea-
ture vectors that led to the alerts. Our GD then exploits a new
insight – the conditional distribution of true positive feature
vectors differs from false positive feature vectors – to robustly
classify neighborhoods as malicious.
use of obfuscated code, or making web/HTTP requests. Further,
machine learning-based detectors have been shown to be susceptible
to evasion attacks [56, 64, 72] that either increase false negatives
or force detectors to output more false positives. As a result, global
detectors in enterprises with ∼100K local detectors have to process
millions of alerts per day [4] which stresses heavy-weight program
analyses and human analysts who investigate the final alerts [8]
– our goal is to build a robust global detector that amplifies weak
local detectors.
Challenges for prior work. Boosting weak detectors using purely
machine learning techniques is challenging. The dominant approaches
are (a) clustering: combine feature vectors using some distance met-
ric to identify suspicious clusters of feature vectors [53, 70, 73, 75],
and (b) counting: train local detectors (LDs) such as Random Forests
to generate local alerts, and generate a global alert if there is a sig-
nificant fraction of local alerts in the enterprise [30, 37, 38, 60]. Both
approaches have limitations that force enterprises to deploy brittle
rule-sets that explicitly correlate local detector alerts.
Clustering algorithms are well-known to be highly sensitive to
noise, especially in the high-dimensional regime [32, 42, 71]. Indeed,
classical approaches that attempt to detect or to score "outlyingness"
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of points (e.g. Stahel-Donoho outlyingness, Mahalanobis distance,
minimum volume ellipsoid, minimum covariance determinant, etc)
are fundamentally flawed in the high-dimensional regime (i.e., theo-
retically cannot guarantee correct detection with high probability).
In practice, we see this in prior work [73] where clustering is used
primarily as a first-level analysis to discover malicious incidents
for a human analyst (i.e. requires lower accuracy than a global de-
tector). In Appendix A we find that a clustering global detector is
ineffective in early stages of infection where our detector succeeds
– i.e., clustering yields an Area Under Curve (AUC) metric of only ∼
48% against waterhole attack and phishing attacks.
Count-based global detectors (Count-GD), on the other hand,
suffer because they need to know the size of local detector com-
munities extremely accurately to determine whether a significant
fraction is raising alerts. In practice though, these communities of
local detectors are extremely ‘noisy’. For example, consider a com-
munity of machines in an enterprise who are potentially exposed to
a so-called waterhole attack [20] (where a compromised webpage
spreads malicious code to machines in the enterprise). Here, a mali-
cious javascript-advertisement might be targeted by an ad-broker
to only a fraction of visitors to a set of webpages. Further, the spe-
cific exploit might only succeed on a small fraction of machines
that did receive the exploit because of browser versions or patching
status. Surprisingly, our experiments show that if Count-GD under-
estimates the number of nodes where the exploit ran successfully
(i.e., the community size) by just 2%, its alerts are almost 100% false
positives (similarly, overestimating the community by 14% leads
to almost 0% true positives). Even small errors in estimating the
number of feature vectors in the community linearly affects the
global detector’s decision thresholds.
Proposed Ideas – Neighborhood filtering and Shape. Our in-
tuition is that a weak signal indicative of malicious behavior still
separates true- and false-positive feature vectors, even though local
detectors classify both as malicious. Our proposed system, Shape-
GD, relies on two key insights to correctly identify malicious feature
vectors.
First, attack vectors into a firewalled enterprise create short-lived
and dynamic correlations across nodes – e.g., machines that visit
a specific server (in watering hole attacks) or receive email from
an address (in phishing attacks) are more likely to be compromised
than a random machine in the community. Since an attacker cannot
target a machine inside an enterprise directly, machines that have
been exposed to a common attack vector have correlated alerts. We
call such a set of machines a neighborhood. Neighborhoods thus
concentrate the signal of malware activity that is otherwise not
visible at the overall community level and can thus enable early de-
tection of malware attacks. Neighborhoods are, however, extremely
unpredictable and render cluster and count-based GDs ineffective –
hence we propose Shape-GD to aggregate local detectors’ outputs.
The second insight behind Shape-GD is that the distributional
shape of a set of suspicious feature vectors can robustly separate true
positive neighborhoods from false positive neighborhoods. Shape-
GD analyzes only those feature vectors that cause alerts by the local
detectors (alert-FVs) instead of analyzing all feature vectors. Alert-
FVs thus represent draws from one of two conditional distributions –
i.e., distribution of malicious or benign feature vectors conditioned
on being labeled as suspicious – which are similar but not the same.
Next, while a single suspicious feature vector is uninformative, a
set of such feature vectors can indeed be tested to come from one
of two similar-but-distinct distributions. To conduct this hypothesis
test, Shape-GD introduces a quantitative scoring function that maps
a set of feature vectors (the alert-FVs per neighborhood) into one
scalar value – the ShapeScore of the neighborhood.
Shape-GD composes the two insights – i.e., filters alert-FVs along
neighborhood lines followed by computing the neighborhood’s
shape – and achieves two key properties: (i) the distribution of
the alert-FVs strongly separates malicious and benign neighbor-
hoods (essentially, it separates the true positive alert-FVs from false
positive alert-FVs), and (ii) is robust to noise in neighborhood size
estimates (i.e., we do not need accurate neighborhood sizes and only
need a sufficient number of alert-FVs to make a robust hypothesis
test). Specifically, Shape-GD detects malicious neighborhoods with
less than 1.1% and 2% compromised nodes per neighborhood (in two
case studies involving waterhole and phishing attacks respectively),
at a false positive and true positive rate of 1% and 100% respectively.
Neighborhood filtering and ShapeScore complement each other –
neighborhoods concentrate the weak signal into a small but unpre-
dictable set of feature vectors while ShapeScore extracts this signal
without knowing the precise number of feature vectors.
Contributions.Neighborhood filtering and shape enable structural
information about attack vectors to be captured algorithmically. Our
specific contributions are as follows.
• Neighborhood filtering to ‘reanalyze’ alert feature vectors
instead of only alert time-series, and Shape-GD algorithms
that exploit a new property – the statistical ‘shape’ of a
neighborhood separates the ones with true positives from
those with false positives – to classify neighborhoods as
malicious or benign without knowing their size.
• An efficient detector that can identify malicious neighbor-
hoods using only 15,000 feature vectors (roughly 15 seconds
of data from a 1000-node neighborhood). The detector com-
prises of random forest LDs and a Shape-GD that computes
ShapeScore as the Wasserstein distance between a set of
alert-FVs’ histograms and a reference histogram built using
false positive feature vectors (created by running LDs on
benign programs in uninfected machines that are used to
train the GD).
• Phishing case study. Shape-GD detects a phishing attack
with 1% false positive rate in a medium size enterprise
network with a neighborhood of 1086 nodes when only
17.08 nodes (using temporal neighborhoods) and 4.48 nodes
(with additional mailing-list based structural filtering) are
infected.
• Waterhole attack case study. Shape-GD detects a waterhole
attack with 1% false positive rate when only 107.5 nodes
(using temporal neighborhoods) and 139.9 (with additional
server specific structural filtering) out of ∼ 550, 000 nodes
are infected.
We emphasize that the LD and GD false positives (FPs) have very
different interpretations. In a phishing attack, an LD FP of 1% in a
neighborhood of 1000 nodes means that we will get about 10 FP
alerts per second. The Shape-GD, on the other-hand, uses these LD
FP alerts for decision making. Thus a GD false positive occurs when
it misclassifies a neighborhood of LD alerts – a much rarer scenario.
Specifically, a GD FP rate of 1% means that in our phishing at-
tack scenario, we will receive a global false alert about once every
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100 - 300 hours. Similarly, in the waterhole scenario a global false
positive occurs every 100 sec. Comparing the number of LDs’ FPs
that are reported to a GD in a Count GD v. Shape-GD, temporal
neighborhood filtering reduces total FPs by ∼100× (phishing) and
∼200× (waterhole), while adding structural filtering reduces total
FPs by ∼1000× and ∼830× respectively (Appendix E for details).
Finally, as an auxiliary contribution, we present a methodology to
evaluate detectors where the LD and GD algorithms are tightly inte-
grated. Existing enterprise networks provide black-box LDs (such as
Blue Coat, Symantec etc) that push alert logs into ‘SIEM’ tools (like
Splunk) where GD algorithms and visualization tools are deployed.
Section 5 describes the limitations of three real settings we have
worked on – a real enterprise dataset, a university network test-bed,
and the SymantecWINE dataset. None of these allow aGD to acquire
alert feature vectors from LDs. Instead, we incorporate a host-level
malware analysis setup [45] into real enterprise data center [7] and
email [6] traces, vary the rates of infection systematically, and thus
determine the operating range of Shape-GD agnostic of one specific
sequence of events. This methodology offers a more robust measure
of Shape-GD’s detection rate under adaptive malware that can alter
its infection behavior in response to Shape-GD’s analysis.
2 OVERVIEW OF SHAPE-GD
Threat model and Deployment. We assume a standard threat
model where trusted local detectors (LDs) at each machine commu-
nicate with a trusted global detector (GD) that receives alerts and
other metadata from the local detectors. The LDs are isolated from
untrusted applications on local machines using OS- (e.g., SELinux)
and hardware mechanisms (e.g., ARMTrustZone), and communicate
with the enterprise’s GD through an authenticated channel. The
GD is trained as a standard anomaly detector – using benign data
generated from uninfected (e.g. test/quality-assurance) machines
that run LDs on benign software, or assuming the current state of
the system as benign in order to detect future malware as anomalies.
Shape-GD fits deployment models that are common today. Cur-
rently, enterprises use SIEM tools (like HP Arcsight and Splunk) to
monitor network traffic and system/application logs, malware anal-
ysis sandboxes that scan emails for malicious links and attachments,
in addition to host-based malware detectors (LDs) from Symantec,
McAfee, Lookout, etc. We use exactly these side-information – from
network logs (client-IP, server IP, timestamp) and email monitor-
ing tools – to instantiate neighborhoods and filter LDs’ alert-FVs
based on neighborhoods (Algorithm 2). Upon receiving alert-FVs,
Shape-GD runs its malware detection algorithm (Algorithm 3) for all
neighborhoods the alert-FVs belong to. If a particular neighborhood
is suspicious, then Shape-GD will notify a downstream analysis
(deeper static/dynamic analyses or human analysts) and forward
relevant information in the incident report.
The key difference is that Shape-GD needs to know the alert
feature vectors from the LDs – black-box LDs do not currently
provide these. Hence (e.g., osquery-based) co-designed LD-GD de-
tectors [9, 13] are the most appropriate deployment counterpart for
Shape-GD– this also motivates our experimental setup combining
host-level malware analysis and web-service/email datasets.
Operationally, the LD at each machine transforms its input signal
into an alert time series. This transformation consists of two steps:
(a) Generate Feature Vectors: convert the raw OS system calls trace
into a feature vector (FV) time series, and (b) Generate Alerts: Deter-
mine if each FV is malicious or not using a local detector (typically
through random forests, SVM, etc.).
Inferringneighborhoods fromcommonattack vectors. Shape-
GD operates over dynamic neighborhoods, which are updated once
per neighborhood timewindow (NTW). Neighborhoodswithin large
communities are a set of nodes that share a statically defined action
attribute within the current time window – this allows an analyst
to create neighborhoods of nodes based on common attack vectors.
Below are some illustrative examples of communities and neighbor-
hoods – we focus our experiments on the first two examples that
are responsible for a large fraction of malware in enterprises.
1. Waterhole attack. The community here consists of the employees
of an enterprise such as Anthem Health [15, 17]. In a waterhole
attack, adversaries compromise a website commonly visited by such
employees as a way to infiltrate the enterprise network and then
spread within the network to a privileged machine or user. Within
this community, a neighborhood can be the set of nodes that visited
the same type of websites within the current neighborhood time
window (for example, some percentile of suspicious links rated by
VirusTotal [18] or SecureRank [14]). Since these rankings them-
selves are fuzzy, and the websites and their contents are dynamic,
neighborhoods only indicate a probability that the node was actually
exposed to an exploit.
2. Phishing attack over enterprise email networks. The community
here consists of all employeeswithin an enterprise. A phishing attack
here would typically spread over email and use a malicious URL to
lure nodes (users) to drive-by-download attacks [1, 16] or spread
through malicious attachments. Here, a specific user’s neighbors
are that subset of users with whom she/he exchanged emails with
during the current neighborhood time window.
Similar correlations occur in physical hardware attacks – commu-
nity here consists of all machines in a workplace that are physically
proximal (e.g. machines in a specific hospital or bank determined us-
ing the configuration of LAN/WiFi infrastructure, GPS information
etc). The potential attack mode here is through physical hardware
such as badUSB. The neighborhood of a node is simply all other
nodes in the neighborhood that were connected to similar external
hardware (e.g. a USB drive) over the current neighborhood time
window.
Attacks that target specific app-stores (e.g., the Key-Raider at-
tack in the Cydia app-store or the malicious Xcode attacks due to
compromised mirror sites) also propagated across users with spe-
cific attributes (membership in a store or downloaded Xcode from
specific sites) more likely than a random user in the network.
2.1 Intuition behind Shape-GD
The statistical shape of local detectors’ false positives (FP conditional
distribution) differs from the corresponding shape for true positives
(TP conditional distribution) – we use this property to aggregate
LDs’ alert-FVs to find the shape of each neighborhood and then
classify neighborhoods based on their shapes.
The central question then is – why do true- and false-positive FVs’
shapes differ? To explain this and set the stage for Shape-GD, we
consider a stylized statistical inference example. Suppose that we
have an unknown number of nodes within a neighborhood. We
want to distinguish between two extremes – all nodes only run
benign applications (benign hypothesis), or all nodes are running
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Figure 2: (Shape of conditional distributions) The top left fig-
ure is the probability density function (pdf) of benign feature
vectors, here a Gaussian with mean ‘-1’; and the top right
figure is the pdf for malicious feature vectors, here a Gauss-
ian with mean‘+1’. The optimal local detector at any machine
would declare ’malware’ if a sample’s value is positive, and de-
clare ’benign’ if a sample’s value is negative. The bottom plots
shows the pdfs of the same Gaussians but now conditioned on
the event that the sample is positive – the pdfs corresponding
to false positive and true positive feature vectors respectively
have different shapes.
malware (malware hypothesis). We look at a single snapshot of time
where each node generates exactly one feature vector. Under the
benign hypothesis, assume that the feature vector from each node
is a (scalar valued) sample from a standard Gaussian with mean of
‘-1’; alternatively it is standard Gaussian with mean of ‘+1’ under
the malware hypothesis.
(a) Noisy local detectors: Given one sample (i.e., FV from one
node), the best local detector is a threshold test: is the sample’s value
above zero or below? For this example, the probability of a false
positive is (about) 15%.
(b)Aggregating local detectors over neighborhoods: Suppose there
are 100 nodes and all of them report their value, and we are told that
90 of them are greater than 0 (i.e., 90 of the local detectors generate
alerts). In this case, the expected number of alerts under the benign
hypothesis is 15; and 85 under the malware hypothesis. Thus, we
can conclude with overwhelming certainty (10−75 chance of error)
that 90 alerts indicate an infected neighborhood. This corresponds
to a conventional threshold algorithm that count the number of
alarms in a neighborhood and compares with a global threshold
(here this threshold is 50).
(c)Count without knowing neighborhood size: Suppose, now, that
we do not know the number of nodes (i.e., neighborhood size is un-
known), and only know that there are a total of 90 alerts. In other
words, out of the neighborhood of nodes, some 90 of them whose
samples were positive reported so. What can we say? Unfortunately
we cannot say much – if there were 100 nodes in neighborhood, then
malware is extremely likely; however, if there were 1000 total nodes,
then with 90 alerts, it is by far (exponentially) more likely that we
have no infection. Because we do not know the neighborhood size,
the global threshold cannot be computed.
(d) Robustness of Shape: While the number of alerts alone is un-
informative, we can resolve whether the neighborhood is a ‘false
positive’ or ‘true positive’ by considering the actual values of the 90
random variables corresponding to these alerts. These values repre-
sent independent draws from a conditional distribution – either the
distribution of a normal random variable of mean ’−1’ conditioned on
taking a nonnegative value, or the distribution of a normal random
variable of mean ’+1’ conditioned on taking a nonnegative value (see
Figure 2). This conditioning occurs because of the local detector –
recall it tags a sample as an alert if and only if the sample drawn
was nonnegative (optimal LD in this example). Thus, irrespective of
the size of the neighborhood, the global detector would “look at the
shape” of the empirical distribution (i.e. the distribution constructed
from the received samples) of the received samples (FVs). If this
were “closer” to the left rather than the right plot in Figure 2, it
would declare “uninfected”; otherwise declare “infected”.
2.2 From Intuition to Algorithm Design
Interestingly, we show that the intuition behind this simple example
scales to real malware detectors that use high-dimensional feature
vectors. However, to use this insight in practice, we need to address
two issues: (i) while the two figures in Figure 2 are visually dis-
tinct, an algorithmic approach requires a quantitative score function
to separate between the (vector-valued) conditional distributions
generated from feature vector samples; and (ii) the global detector
receives only finitely many samples; thus, we can construct (at best)
only a noisy estimate of the conditional distribution. We describe
Shape-GD’s details in Section 4 but present the key intuition here.
We introduce ShapeScore – a score function based on theWasser-
stein distance [19] to resolve between conditional distributions. We
choose Wasserstein distance because it has well-known robustness
properties to finite-sample binning [22, 66], was more discrimina-
tive than L1/L2 distances in our experiments, and yet is efficient to
compute for vectors.
Specifically, given a collection of feature vector samples, we con-
struct an empirical (vector) histogram of the FV samples, and de-
termine the Wasserstein distance of this histogram with respect
to a reference histogram. This reference histogram is constructed
from the feature vectors corresponding to the false positives of the
local detectors. In other words, this reference histogram captures
the statistical shape of the “failures” of the LDs – i.e., those FVs that
the LD classifies as malicious even though they arise from benign
applications. Computing the reference histogram does not require
analysts to manually label alert-FVs as false positives – these can
be generated by running the LDs on benign software in uninfected
machines (e.g., test or quality-assurance machines, by recording
and replaying real user traces on benign applications on training
servers, etc). Alternatively, analysts can use applications deployed
currently and recompute the reference histogram periodically – this
is similar to anomaly detectors where the goal is to label anomalous
behaviors as (potentially) malicious.
If we had the idealized scenario of infinite number of feature
vector samples, the ShapeScore would be uniquely and deterministi-
cally known. In practice however, we have only a limited number of
feature vector samples; thus ShapeScore is noisy. Our experiments
(Figure 3) test its robustness with Windows benign and malicious
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applications (Section 6), where the ShapeScore is computed from
neighborhood sizes of 15,000 FVs (about 15 seconds of data from 1000
nodes). The key result is the strong statistical separation between
the ShapeScores for the TP and FP feature vectors respectively, thus
lending credence to our approach. Importantly, both these ideas do
not depend on knowing the neighborhood size; thus they provide a
new lens to study malware at a global level.
3 RELATEDWORK
3.1 Behavioral analysis
Behavioral analysis refers to statistical methods that monitor signals
from program execution, extract features and build models from
these signals, and then use these models to classify processes as
malicious. Importantly, as we discuss in this section, all known
behavioral detectors have a high false positive and negative rate
(especially when zero-day and mimicry attacks are factored in).
System-calls and middleware API calls have been studied exten-
sively as a signal for behavioral detectors [21, 25, 27, 34, 36, 59, 69].
Network intrusion detection systems [57] analyze network traffic
to detect known malicious or anomalous behaviors. More recently,
behavioral detectors use signals such as power consumption[29],
CPU utilization, memory footprint, and hardware performance
counters[31, 65].
Detectors then extract features from these raw signals. For exam-
ple, an n-gram is a contiguous sequence of n items that captures
total order relations [25, 38], n-tuples are ordered events that do
not require contiguity, and bags are simply histograms. These can
be combined to create bags of tuples, tuples of bags, and tuples
of n-grams [25, 34] often using principal component analysis to
reduce dimensions. Further, system calls with their arguments form
a dependency graph structure that can be compared to sub-graphs
that represent malicious behaviors [21, 27, 46].
Finally, detectors train models to classify executions into mal-
ware/benignware using supervised (signature-based) or unsuper-
vised (anomaly-based) learning. These models range from distance
metrics, histogram comparison, hidden markov models (HMM), and
neural networks (artificial neural networks, fuzzy neural networks,
etc.), to more common classifiers such as kNN, one-class SVMs,
decision trees, and ensembles thereof.
Such machine learning models, however, result in high false
positives and negatives. Anomaly detectors can be circumvented
by mimicry attacks where malware mimics system-calls of benign
applications [69] or hides within the diversity of benign network
traffic[63]. Sommer et al. [63] additionally highlights several prob-
lems that can arise due to overfitting a model to a non-representative
training set, suggesting signature-based detectors as the primary
choice for real deployments. Unfortunately, signature-based detec-
tors cannot detect new (zero-day) attacks. On Android, both system
calls [24] and hardware-counter based detectors [31] yield ∼20%
false positives and ∼80% true positives.
Finally, with their ability to extract highly effective features, deep
nets may provide a new way forward for creating novel behavioral
detectors. At the global level, however, what is needed is a data-
light approach for global detection by composing local detectors,
tailored to be agile enough to do global detection in a fast-changing
(non-stationary) environment.
Algorithm 1: Local Detector
Input :Sequence of executed system calls
Output :Alert-FVs
1 Let id be LD’s identifier
2 while True do
3 syscall -hist ← r -sec histogram of system calls
4 syscall -histPCA ← project syscall -hist on L-dim PCA basis
5 label ← BinaryClassifier(syscall -histPCA);
6 if label =malicious then
7 aler t -FV ← syscall -histPCA
8 send < aler t -FV , id > to Shape-GD
3.2 Collaborative Intrusion Detection Systems
(CIDS)
Collaborative intrusion detection systems (CIDS) provide an archi-
tecture where LDs’ alerts are aggregated by a global detector (GD).
GDs can use either signature-based or anomaly-based[67, 74], or
even a combination of the two [48] to generate global alerts. Addi-
tionally, the CIDS architecture can be centralized, hierarchical, or
distributed (using a peer-to-peer overlay network) [74].
In all cases, existing GDs use some variant of either clustering
or count-based algorithms to aggregate LDs’ alerts. Count-based
GD raises an alert once the number of alerts exceeds a threshold
within a space-time window, while clustering-based GD may apply
some heuristics to control the number of alerts [30, 37, 38, 60, 70].
In HIDE [74], the global detector at each hierarchical-tier is a neural
network trained on network traffic information. Worminator[50]
additionally uses bloom filters to compact LDs’ outputs and sched-
ules LDs to form groups in order to spread alert information quickly
through a distributed system. All count- and clustering-based algo-
rithms are fragile when the noise is high (in the early stages of an
infection) and when the network size is uncertain. In contrast, our
neighborhood filtering and shape-based GD is robust against such
uncertainty.
Note that distributed CIDSs are vulnerable to probe-response
attacks, where the attacker probes the network to find the location
and defensive capabilities of an LD [23, 61, 62]. These attacks are
orthogonal to our setting since we do not have fixed LDs (i.e. all
nodes are LDs).
4 SHAPE GD ALGORITHM
Our algorithm consists of feature extraction, local detector (LD),
and the global detector (GD). Our key innovations are in the GD,
however, we also discuss feature extraction and LD design for com-
pleteness.
Feature Extraction algorithm. This algorithm transforms the
continuously evolving 390-dimensional time-series of Windows
system calls into a discrete-time sequence of feature-vectors (FVs).
This is accomplished by chunking the continuous time series into
r−second intervals, and representing the system call trace over each
interval as a single L−dimensional vector (Algorithm 1, lines 3–4).
L is typically a low dimension, reduced down from 390 using PCA
analysis, to (in our experiments) L = 10 and r = 1 second.
Local Detector (LD) Algorithm. The LD algorithm (Algorithm
1) leverages the current state-of-the-art techniques in automated
malware detection to generate a sequence of alerts from the FV
sequence. Specifically, using both its internal state and the current
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Algorithm 2: Neighborhoods from Attack-Vectors
Input :Template-type, NTW
Output :Set of active neighborhoods NBDs
[time, time+NTW] defines the current time window
1 time← current time
2 while True do
3 if Template-type = waterhole attack then
4 V := client machines*
5 S := accessed servers*
6 predicate(A:Client, B:Servers) := A accesses B
7 else if Template-type = phishinд attack then
8 V := email recipient machines*
9 S := mailing lists*
10 predicate(A:Recipient, B:Mailing list) := A ⊆ B
partitioning a set into non-disjoint sets to incorporate
structural filtering
11 P1, P2, ..., PN ← partition-set(S ), where S =
N⋃
i=1
Pi
form neighborhoods NBi using partitions Pi
12 NBi ← {V | predicate(V , Pi )}
set expiration time for a neighborhood NBi
13 NBi .expiration-time← t+NTW
add all neighborhoods to the set NBDs
14 NBDs ← {NBi | ∀i in [1, N ]}
advance time by NTW sec
15 time← time+NTW
*active within the time window [time, time+NTW]
FV, the LD algorithm generates an alert if it thinks that this FV
corresponds to malware, and produces no alert if it thinks that the
current FV is benign (lines 5–8). Henceforth, we define an alert-
FV to be an FV that generates an LD alert (either true or false
positive). In our experiments each LD employs Random Forest as
a binary classifier for malware detection because Random Forest
achieves the best performance on the training data set among the
classifiers from a prior survey [25] and have been shown to be robust
to adversarial inputs – we pick an operating point of 92.4% true
positives at a false positive rate of 6% from the LD’s ROC curve
(which is similar to detection rates in prior work [25]). We have
described our experiments with picking the best LD from a prior
survey [25] in Appendix B and Figure 12.
Neighborhood Instances from Attack-Templates. Each neigh-
borhood time window (NTW), Shape GD generates neighborhood
instances (Algorithm 2) based on statically defined attack vectors
– each attack vector is a “Template” to generate neighborhoods
with. Algorithm 2 shows how the concept of neighborhood unifies
operationally distinct attacks like waterhole and phishing.
The template for detecting a waterhole attack forms a neighbor-
hood out of client nodes that access a server or a group of servers
within a neighborhood time window. The other template, which is
used for detection of a phishing attack, includes in a neighborhood
email recipient machines belonging to a set of mailing lists. The two
templates are shown in lines 3–10.
For simplicity we present a batch version of the neighborhood
instantiation algorithm (Algorithm 2) which advances time by NTW
and creates new neighborhoods for each NTW. In contrast, the on-
line Shape GD version updates already existing neighborhoodswhile
monitoring client–server interactions in real-time – we demonstrate
the online Shape GD algorithm to detect waterhole attacks and the
batch version against phishing attacks in our evaluation.
The neighborhood instantiation algorithm accepts a template
type as input, i.e. either a template for detecting a waterhole attack
or a phishing attack, and duration of an NTW. The algorithm runs
once per NTW – starting by defining the sets V and S that will
be used to form neighborhoods. For a waterhole attack, the set V
includes all client machines accessing a set of servers and S is a set
of the accessed servers. To instantiate neighborhoods for a phishing
attack, V is a set of all email recipient machines and S is a set of
mailing lists. In both cases the algorithm considers only the entities
that are active within a current NTW window.
Each attack requires a predicate that determines relation between
the elements of the sets V and S . For a waterhole attack such a
predicate is true if a client accesses one of the servers (line 6). In the
case of a phishing template, the predicate is evaluated to true if a
recipient belongs to a particular mailing list (line 10).
The neighborhood instantiation algorithm proceeds with parti-
tioning the set S into one or more disjoint subsets Pi (line 11). This
is to incorporate ‘structural filtering’ into the algorithm, allowing an
analyst to create neighborhoods based on subsets of servers (instead
of all servers in case of waterhole) or divide all mailing lists into
subsets of mailing lists (in the phishing). Structural filtering boosts
detection under certain conditions (see Section 6.3).
The neighborhood instantiation algorithm builds a neighborhood
for each partition Pi using a corresponding predicate (line 12). After
forming a neighborhood, the algorithm sets its expiration time (line
13), which is the end of the current NTW window. All the neighbor-
hoods in the set NBDs are discarded at the end of the current NTW
window. Finally, the algorithm adds the just formed neighborhoods
to NBDs (line 14) and advances time by one NTW (line 15).
The template-based neighborhood instantiation algorithm (Algo-
rithms 2) shares the NBDs data structure with the Algorithm 3 that
uses neighborhoods’ shapes to detect malware.
MalwareDetection in aNeighborhood.Algorithm 3 detects mal-
ware per neighborhood instead of individual nodes. The input to the
algorithm is a set of alert-FVs from each neighborhood and its out-
put is a global alert for the neighborhood. We now describe how
the algorithm distinguishes between the conditional distributions of
alert-FVs from true-positive and false positive neighborhoods.
The key algorithmic idea is to first extract neighborhood-level
features – i.e., to map all alert-FVs within a neighborhood to a single
vector-histogramwhich robustly captures the neighborhood’s statis-
tical properties. Then, Shape GD compares this vector-histogram to
a reference vector-histogram (built offline during training) to yield
the neighborhood’s ShapeScore. The reference vector-histogram is
constructed from a set of false positive alert-FVs – thus, it captures
the statistical shape of misclassifications (FPs) by the LDs but at a
neighborhood scale. Finally, Shape-GD trains a classifier to detect
anomalous ShapeScores as malware. This is a key step in Shape-GD
– i.e., mapping alert-FVs from a neighborhood into a single vector-
histogram and then into a discriminative yet robust ShapeScore lets
us analyze the joint properties of all alert-FVs generated within a
neighborhood without requiring the FVs to be clustered or alerts to
be counted. We describe these steps in further detail.
Generating histograms from alert-FVs. The algorithm aggre-
gates L-dimensional projections of alert-FVs on per neighborhood
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Algorithm 3:Malware Detection in a Neighborhood
Input :L-dim projections of alert-FVs
Output :Malicious neighborhoods
1 Let NBDs be a set of neighborhoods
2 for each NB in NBDs do
aggregate L-dim projections of alert-FVs on per neighborhood basis
3 B ← {aler t − FV s | node id ⊆ NB }
build an (L, b)-dim. vector-histogram
4 HB ← bin & normalize B along each dimension
compute a neighborhood score – ShapeScore
5 ShapeScore ←Wasserstein Dist.(HB , Href )
perform hypothesis testing
6 if ShapeScore > γ then
7 label NB as malicious
basis into a set B (Algorithm 3, line 3). After that, Shape GD converts
low dimensional representation of alert-FVs, the set B, into a single
(L,b)-dimensional vector-histogram denoted by HB (line 4). The
conversion is performed by binning L-dimensional vectors within
the B set along each dimension. In each of the L-dimensions, the
scalar-histogram of the corresponding component of the vectors is
binned and normalized. Effectively, a vector-histogram is a matrix
Lxb, where L is the dimensionality of alert-FVs and b is the number
of bins per dimension.
We use standard methods to determine the size and number of
bins and note that the choice of Wasserstein distance in the next
step makes Shape GD robust against variations due to binning.
In particular, we tried square-root choice, Rice rule, and Doane’s
formula [5] to estimate the number of bins, and we found that
20–100 bins yielded separable histograms (as in Figure 3) for the
Windows dataset and fixed it at 50 for our experiments.
ShapeScore.We get the ShapeScore by comparing this histogram,
HB , to a reference histogram, Href , which is generated during the
training phase using only the false positive FVs of the LDs. We run
LDs on the system-call traces generated by benign apps – the FVs
corresponding to the alerts from the LD (i.e., the false positives) are
then used to construct the reference histogram Href . ShapeScore
is thus the distance of a neighborhood from a benign reference
histogram – a high score indicates potential malware.
To collect known benign traces, a straightforward approach is
to use test inputs on benign apps or use record-and-replay tools to
re-run real user inputs in a malware-free system. Or, like any anom-
aly detector, an enterprise can train Shape-GD using applications
deployed currently and recompute Hr ef periodically.
The ShapeScore of the accumulated set of FVs, B, is given by the
sum of the coordinate-wise Wasserstein distances [66] (Algorithm
3, line 5) between
HB = (HB (1) HB (2) . . . HB (L))
and
Href = (Href (1) Href (2) . . . Href (L)).
In other words,
ShapeScore =
L∑
l=1
dW (HB (l),Href (l)),
where for two scalar distributions p,q, the Wasserstein distance
[19, 66] is given by
dW (p,q) =
b∑
i=1
 i∑j=1 (p(j) − q(j))
 .
This Wasserstein distance serves as an efficiently computable
one dimensional projection, that gives us a discriminatively pow-
erful metric of distance [22, 66]. Because the Wasserstein distance
computes a metric between distributions – for us, histograms nor-
malized to have total area equal to 1 – it is invariant to the number
of samples that make up each histogram. Thus, unlike count-based
algorithms, it is robust to estimation errors in community size. Fig-
ure 3 verifies this intuition, and shows that true positives and false
positive feature vectors separate well when viewed through the
ShapeScore.
Finally, to determinewhether a neighborhood hasmalware present
we perform hypothesis testing. If ShapeScore is greater than a thresh-
old γ , we declare a global alert, i.e., the algorithm predicts that
there is malware in the neighborhood (lines 6–7). The robustness
threshold γ is computed via standard confidence interval or cross-
validation methods with multiple sets of false-positive FVs (see
Section 6.1).
Computing Shape GD’s parameters. Here we elaborate on the
steps that should be taken in a real world environment to choose
parameters. The steps discussed here are generic and are applicable
to other attacks beyond waterhole and phishing – the following
results section quantifies each of these steps.
First, an analyst should start with designing an appropriate algo-
rithm to run on local detectors (LDs) (Appendix B). To achieve this,
an analyst needs to compare the performance of multiple feature
extraction (FE) algorithms combined with a diverse set of machine
learning classifiers. Oneway to choose the best pair of a FE algorithm
and a classifier is to build ROC curves for each pair, and select the
pair that meets the desired detection rate to computation/training
effort for the LD.
Second, the analyst needs to determine whether even a purely
malicious neighborhood can be separated from benign ones, and the
minimum number of FVs per neighborhood to do so (Sections 6.1
and Appendix C). This number depends on the false positive rate of
LDs ( e.g., in our experiments, we determined that a neighborhood
should generate at least 15K FVs, see Figure 13).
Third, we need to choose an NTW based on the false positive rate
(FP) and the desired time-to-detection (Section 6.2. A small NTW
means more frequent transfers of FVs from LD to GD, whereas a
long NTW means that more nodes can get compromised before
the GD makes a decision and/or FPs can drown out TPs. Similarly,
structural filtering can improve detection rate if the true positive
alert-FVs are not deluged by the rate of false-positive alert-FVs –
Section 6.3 quantifies how this trade-off differs for waterhole and
phishing.
5 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
5.1 Case for a New Methodology
Shape-GD experiments require datasets where the global detector
can acquire alert-FVs from local detectors, similar to osquery-based
systems where the LD and GD are co-designed. We describe our
experience with three existing methodologies and datasets – none
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of them allow alert-FVs to be acquired, provide complete ground
truth infection information, or allow the infection rate to be varied.
This motivates the methodology we use to systematically evaluate
Shape-GD.
Analysis of existing datasets. Prior work has used enterprise
logs [55] that are unavailable publicly. We have acquired similar
security logs from a Fortune 500 company with a 200K machine
network – the logs average 250M entries per day over a 2 year
period, arise from 20 closed-source endpoint local detectors such
as Symantec, McAfee, Blue Coat, etc, have almost 500 sparsely
populated dimensions per log entry, and about 75% of the log entries
lack important identity and event-timestamp information and are
delayed by up to 60 days. Commercial (black-box) LDs do not expose
feature vectors for external analysis.
We have also acquired network pcap traces from our university
network, emulating prior work [39] in network-only global detec-
tors. University security groups (like ours) are only allowed to collect
network-layer pcap information for a rolling 2-week period and
cannot instrument host machines (that are owned by students and
visitors) – i.e., our 4TB/day dataset from 150K machines is unsuit-
able to evaluate Shape-GD because it doesn’t have LDs. Extending
this dataset with a weak LD – the ability to inspect executables in a
sandbox downloaded by hosts (e.g., as pursued by Lastline [12]) –
would be an appropriate experimental setup but sensitive data is-
sues make such datasets hard to get. Hence, we model this extended
setup in our methodology.
We have analyzed Symantec’s WINE dataset [49] and found it
inadequate to evaluate Shape-GD even after layering VirusTotal in-
formation on it. Specifically, the WINE dataset includes downloader
graphs [49] – the nodes are executables and the edges represent
whether the source downloaded the destination executable – and
represent downloader trojans (‘droppers’) in malware distribution
networks [58] that download payloads to steal information, encrypt
the disk, etc on to the host. This dataset covers 5 years of data with
25M files (specifically, hashes that represent files) on over 1M ma-
chines – however, only 1.5M of the 25M hashes have reports on
VirusTotal. Hence, one cannot reconstruct (alert) feature vectors for
the hashes stored in the downloader graph.
Shape-GD re-analyzes (local) alert feature vectors in the global
detector – filtering alert-FVs into neighborhoods and then com-
puting the neighborhoods’ shapes. Hence we model osquery-like
deployments as used in enterprises like Facebook and Google where
the LDs and GDs are co-designed and GDs can acquire alert-FVs.
Simulatingmalware propagation in a network.Methodologies
that use existing datasets with malware propagation (like the ones
above) have an inherent weakness. Such datasets have one sequence
of malware propagation events “hardwired” into the dataset and do
not allow us to analyze how a detection mechanism reacts to varia-
tions of malware propagation dynamics, especially when malware
can adapt these dynamics. Instead, we propose to vary the rate of
infection (which changes the neighborhood formation) and deter-
mine Shape-GD’s detection performance across different infection
rates.
Further, none of the above datasets provide ground truth informa-
tion about the true extent of infections, incentivizing a design that
minimizes false positives at the expense of false negatives. In a con-
trolled setting where host-level malware and benignware traces are
overlaid onto a trace of web-service/email communication, we can
maintain ground truth information and determine false positives
and negatives precisely.
To this end, we use a malware and benignware dataset from a
recent related work [45], train an LD with histogram-based feature
vectors and a Random Forest detector based on a recent survey on
host-level malware detection [25], and overlay these host-level re-
sults on web-service (network) and email traces using two standard
(and publicly available) datasets from Yahoo data centers and Enron
respectively. We describe this methodology in detail next.
5.2 Benign and Malware Applications
We collect data from thousands of benign applications and malware
samples. To avoid tracing program executions where malware may
not have executed any stage of its exploit or payload correctly, we
set a threshold of 100 system calls per execution to be considered a
success. Our experiments successfully run 1,311 malware samples
from 193 malware families collected in July 2013 [45], and 2,364
more recent samples from 13 popular malware families collected in
2015 [11], to compare against traces from 1,889 benign applications.
We record time stamped sequences of executed system calls using
Intel’s Pin dynamic binary instrumentation tool. Each Amazon AWS
virtual machine instance runs Windows Server 2008 R2 Base on the
default T2 micro instances with 1GB RAM, 1 vCPU, and 50GB local
storage. The VMs are populated with user data commonly found
on a real host including PDFs, Word documents, photos, Firefox
browser history, Thunderbird calendar entries and contacts, and
social network credentials. To avoid interference between malware
samples, we execute each sample in a fresh install of the reference
VM. As malware may try to propagate over the local network, we set
up a sub-net of VMs accessible from the VM that runs the malware
sample. In this sub-net, we left open common ports (HTTP, HTTPS,
SMTP, DNS, Telnet, and IRC) used bymalware to execute its payload.
We run each benign and malware program 10 times for 5 minutes
per run for a total of almost 53,000 hours total compute time on
Amazon AWS.
Overall, benignware and malware were active for 141,670 sec
and 283,270 seconds respectively, executing an average of 11,900
and 13,500 system calls per second respectively. Using 1 second
time window (Section 4) and sliding the time windows by 1ms, we
extract histograms of system calls within each time window as the
ML feature, and finally pick 1.5M benign and 1Mmalicious FVs from
this dataset for the experiments that follow. Importantly, we do not
constrain the samples on neighboring machines to belong to the
same families – as described above, malware today predominantly
spreads throughmalware distribution networks where a downloader
trojan (‘dropper’) can distribute arbitrary and unrelated payloads
on hosts. We want to test Shape-GD in the extreme case where
malicious FVs can be assigned from any malware execution to any
machine.
5.3 Modeling Waterhole and Phishing Attacks
Waterhole attack. To model a waterhole attack, we use Yahoo’s
“G4: Network Flows Data" [7] dataset, which contains communica-
tion data between end-users and Yahoo servers. The 41.4 GB (in
compressed form) of data were collected on April 29-30, 2008. Each
netflow record includes a timestamp, source/destination IP address,
source/destination port, protocol, number of packets and the num-
ber of bytes transferred from the source to the destination.Wemodel
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the setting where heuristics such as SecureRank [14] are applied to
identify suspicious servers and we assume that Shape-GD monitors
the top (here, 50) suspicious servers based on SecureRank’s scores.
Specifically, we use 5 hours of network traffic (208 million records)
captured on April 29, 2008 between 8 am and 1 pm at the border
routers connecting Dallas Yahoo data center (DAX) to the Internet.
The selected 50 DAX servers communicate with 3,181,127 client
machines over 14,249,931 requests.
We assume that an attacker compromises one of the most fre-
quently accessed DAX server – 118.242.107.76, which processes
∼ 752, 000 requests within 5-hour time window (∼ 43.7 requests per
second). In our simulation it gets compromised at random instant
between 8am and 10.30am. Hence, Shape GD can use the remain-
ing 2.5 hours to detect the attack (our results show that less than
a hundred seconds suffice). Following infection, we simulate this
‘waterhole’ server compromising client machines over time with
an infection probability parameter – this helps us determine the
time to detection at different rates of infection. The benign and
compromised machines then select corresponding type of execution
trace (i.e., a sequence of FVs generated in Section 5.2) and input
these to their LDs.
Phishing attack.We simulate a phishing attack in a medium size
corporate network of 1086 nodes that exchange emails with others
in the network. To model email communication, we pick 50 email
threads with 100 recipients each from the publicly available Enron
email dataset [6] (the union of all email threads’ recipients is 1086).
We start the simulation with these 50 emails being sent into
the 1086-node neighborhood, and seed only one email out of 50
as malicious. We then model the infection speading at different
rates as this malicious email is opened by its (up to 100) recipients
at some time into the simulation and is compromised with some
likelihood when the user ‘clicks’ on the URL in the email. Our goal
is to measure the number of compromised nodes before Shape GD
declares an infection in this neighborhood. All nodes that open and
‘click’ the link in the malicious email will select malware FVs from
Section 5.2 as input to their corresponding LDs, while the remaining
nodes select benign FVs.
To simulate the infection spreading over the email network, we
need to (a) model when a recipient ‘opens’ the email: we do so using
a long tail distribution of reply times where the median open time
is 47 minutes, 90-percentile is one day, and the most likely open
time is 2 minutes [47]; and (b) model the ‘click’ rate (probability
that a recipient clicks on a URL): we vary it from 0% up to 100% to
control the rate of infection. For example, within 1-, 2-, 3-hour long
time interval only 55%, 65%, and 70% of recipients of a malicious
email open it, which corresponds to 55, 65, and 75 infected machines
respectively at 100% click rate.
Overall, these two scenarios differ in their time-scales (seconds v.
hours) and in the relative rate at which benign and malicious neigh-
borhoods grow. As we will see, these parameters have a significant
impact on the composition of neighborhoods and the Shape GD’s
detection rate.
Methodology. We report averaged results from repeating each
experiment multiple times with random initialization parameters.
In particular, we use 10-fold cross validation for machine learning
experiments (Figure 12), 500 randomly sampled benign/malicious
neighborhoods with 10 repetitions to compute average (Figures 3,
13), 100 repetitions of each malware infection experiment (Figures
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Figure 3:Histogram of the ShapeScore: The ShapeScore is com-
puted for neighborhoods with 15,000 FVs each (experiment re-
peated 500 times to generate the histograms). Shape-based GD
can reliably separate FPs and TPs through extracting infor-
mation from the data that has been unutilized by an LD.
4,5,15,10), and 100 repetitions of infection with 10 repetitions per
data-point (Figures 6,7,8,9). To train the reference histogram, Href ,
we select 15K FVs and 100K FVs from the training data set in the
phishing and waterhole experiments respectively. All Shape GD’s
parameters are chosen based on a training data set (used for Figures 3
and 13) – we then evaluate Shape GD (in the remaining figures)
using a completely separate testing data set.
6 RESULTS
We show that Shape-GD can identify malicious neighborhoods
with less than 1% false positive and 100% true positive rate when
the neighborhoods produce more than 15,000 FVs within a neighbor-
hood time window (i.e., |B | > 15, 000 in Algorithm 3). Recall that
at 60 FVs/node/minute, it takes 1000 nodes only 15 seconds to cre-
ate 15,000 FVs. For LDs like ours with ∼6% false positive rate, this
corresponds to 900 alert-FVs. We then simulate realistic attack sce-
narios and find that Shape-GD can detect malware when only 5 of
1086 nodes are infected through phishing in an enterprise email
network, and when only 108 of 550K possible nodes are infected
through a waterhole attack using a popular web-service. Finally,
Shape-GD is computationally efficient – we relegate this discussion
to Appendix D.
6.1 Can shape of alert-FVs identify malicious
neighborhoods?
We first show that the shape of a neighborhood can easily distin-
guish between neighborhoods that are either 100% benign or 100%
malicious. We quantify Shape-GD’s time to detection under real
settings with a mix of both in subsequent sections.
Figure 3 shows that Shape-GD can indeed separate purely be-
nign neighborhoods from purely malicious ones. To conduct this
experiment, we construct purely benign and malicious neighbor-
hoods with ∼15,000 benign or malicious FVs respectively (i.e., |B | is
15,000). In Appendix C, we experimentally quantify the sensitivity
of Shape-GD to the number of FVs in a neighborhood (|B |) and find
that neighborhoods with more than 15,000 FVs lead to robust global
classification.
For each neighborhood, we use the Random Forest LD to gen-
erate alert-FVs and use Shape-GD to compute the neighborhood’s
ShapeScore using the alert-FVs from the neighborhood. In Figure 3,
we plot histogram of ShapeScores for 500 benign and malicious
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FVs each – each point in the blue (or red) histogram represents the
ShapeScore of a completely benign (or malicious) neighborhood. Re-
call that a small ShapeScore indicates the neighborhood’s statistical
shape is similar to that of a benign one. The non-overlapping distribu-
tions separated by a large gap indicate that the shape of purely benign
neighborhoods is very different from the shape of purely malicious
neighborhoods.
Shape-GD detects anomalous neighborhoods by setting a thresh-
old score based on the distribution of benign neighborhoods’ scores
(Figure 3) – if an incoming neighborhood has a score above the
threshold, Shape GD labels it as ‘malicious’, otherwise ‘benign’. We
set the threshold score at 99-percentile (i.e. our expected global false
positive rate is 1%) and the true positive rate is effectively 100% for
this experiment. This shows that for homogeneous neighborhoods
producing over 15K FVs within a neighborhood time window, Shape-
GD can make robust predictions. The next question then is how
well Shape-GD can do so when neighborhoods are partially infected
– we evaluate this in the next section.
6.2 Time to detection using temporal
neighborhoods
Temporal filtering creates a neighborhood using only the nodes that
are activewithin a neighborhood time window (NTW). For example,
a temporal neighborhood for the phishing scenario would include
every email address that received an email within the last hour (1086
nodes in our experiments). Similarly, a waterhole attack scenario
would include all client devices that accessed any server within the
last NTW into one neighborhood (∼ 17, 000 nodes on average in
30 seconds). This neighborhood filtering models a CIDS designed
to detect malware whose infection exhibits temporal locality (and
obviously does not detect attacks that target a few high-value nodes
through temporally uncorrelated vectors).
Phishing and waterhole attacks operate at different time scales
(and hence NTWs). Due to the long tail distribution of email ‘open’
times, the phishing NTW varies from 1–3 hours in our experiments.
On the other hand, a popular waterhole server quickly infects a
large number of clients within a short period of time – thus, we
vary the waterhole NTW from 4 seconds up to 100 seconds.
Shape GD’s time to detection for one NTW. We fix NTWs (1
hour for phishing and 30 seconds for waterhole) and vary a param-
eter that represents a node’s likelihood of infection from 0% up to
100% – modeling whether a phished user clicks the malicious URL
(phishing) or a drive-by exploit succeeeds in a waterhole attacks.
Figures 4 and 5 plot the neighborhood score v. the average num-
ber of infected nodes within benign (blue curve) and malicious (red
curve) neighborhoods – the two extreme points on the X-axis corre-
sponds to either none of the machines being infected (the left side
of a figure) or the maximum possible number of machines being
infected (the right side of the figure). In this experiment, phishing
can infect up to 55 machines in the 1 hour NTW, while the water-
hole server can infect almost 1250 nodes in the 30 seconds NTW.
Every point on a line is the median neighborhood score from 10
experiments with whiskers set at 1%- and 99%- percentile scores.
When increasing the number of infected nodes in a neighbor-
hood, as expected, the red curve larger deviates from the blue one.
Therefore, Shape GD becomes more confident with labeling in-
coming partially infected neighborhoods as malicious. Shape GD
starts reliably detecting malware very quickly – when only 22 nodes
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Figure 4: (Phishing attack: Time-based NF) Dynamics of an
attack: While the portion of infected nodes in a neighborhood
increases over time reaching 55 nodes out of 1086 on average,
ShapeScore goes up showing that Shape GD becomes more con-
fident in labeling neighborhoods as ‘malicious’. It starts de-
tecting malware with at most 1% false positive rate when it
compromises roughly 22 nodes. The neighborhood includes all
1086 nodes in a network and spans over 1 hour time interval.
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Figure 5: (Waterhole attack: Time-based NF) Dynamics of
an attack: While the portion of infected nodes in a neigh-
borhood increases over time reaching 1248 nodes on average,
ShapeScore goes up showing that Shape GD becomes more con-
fident in labeling neighborhoods as ‘malicious’. It starts de-
tecting malware with at most 1% false positive rate when
roughly 200 nodes get compromised. The neighborhood in-
cludes 17,178 nodes on average and spans over 30 sec time in-
terval.
(phishing) and 200 nodes (waterhole) have been infected. We also
experimented with other sizes of neighborhood window – the plots
we obtained showed similar trends.
Shape GD’s sensitivity to NTW.We show that the size of a neigh-
borhood is important for early detection – the minimum number
of nodes that are infected before Shape GD raises an alert – in Fig-
ures 6 and 7. Varying the NTW essentially competes the rates at
which both malicious and benign FVs accumulate – interestingly, we
find that these relative rates are different for phishing and waterhole
attacks and lead to different trends for detection performance v. NTW.
We vary the NTW from 1 hour to 3 hours for phishing and from
4 sec to 100 sec for waterhole and record the number of infected
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Figure 6: (Phishing attack: Time-based NF algorithm) Shape
GD’s performance improves by 18.5% (20.24 and 17.08 infected
nodes) when increasing the size of a neighborhood window
from 1 hour to 3 hours.
nodes when Shape GD can make robust predictions (i.e. less than
1% FP for almost 100% TP).
Increasing the NTW in the phishing experiment from 1 to 3 hours
improves the Shape GD’s detection performance – at 17.08 infected
nodes for a 3 hour NTW compared to 20.24 nodes for a 1 hour NTW.
Detection improves slowly because while the infection rate slows
down over time as fewer emails remain to be opened, the long tail
distribution of email ‘open’ times causes most of the 17 victims to
fall early in the NTW and accumulate sufficient malicious FVs to
tip the overall neighborhood’s shape into malicious category.
In a waterhole scenario, the number of client devices active within
a time window (and hence the false positive alert-FVs from the
neighborhood) grows much faster than the malware can spread
(even if we assume that every client that visits the waterhole server
gets infected. Here, a large NTW aggregates many more benign
(false positive) FVs from clients accessing non-compromised servers.
Hence, in contrast to the phishing attack, increasing the NTW de-
grades time to detection. Shape GD works best with an NTW of
6 seconds – only 107.5 nodes on average become infected out of
a possible ∼550,000 nodes. Note that a very small NTW (below 6
seconds) either does not accumulate enough FVs for analysis – if
so, Shape GD outputs no results – or creates large variance in the
shape of benign neighborhoods and abruptly degrades detection
performance.
Note that a Shape GD requires a minimum number of FVs per
neighborhood to make robust predictions – at least 15,000 FVs based
on Appendix C – hence, the Shape GD has to set NTWs based on
the rate of incoming requests and access frequency of a particular
server. For example, if a server is not very popular and is likely to
be compromised, the Shape GD could increase this server’s NTW
to collect more FVs for its neighborhood.
6.3 Time to detection using structural
information
Both phishing and waterhole attacks impose a logical structure
on nodes (beyond their time of infection): phishing spreads mal-
ware through malicious email attachments or links while waterhole
attacks infect only the clients that access a compromised server.
This structure suggests that temporal neighborhoods can be further
refined based on the sender/recipient-list of an email (e.g., group-
ing members of a mailing list into a neighborhood in the phishing
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Figure 7: (Waterhole attack: Time-based NF) Shape GD’s per-
formance deteriorates linearly when increasing the size of a
neighborhood window from 6 sec to 100 sec.
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Figure 8: (Phishing attack) Comparing to pure time-based NF,
structural filtering algorithm improves Shape GD’s perfor-
mance by ∼ 4× by taking into consideration logical structure
of electronic communication (sender – receiver relation).
scenario) or based on the specific server accessed by a client (i.e.,
grouping clients that visit a server into one neighborhood).
To analyze the effect of such structural filtering on GD’s perfor-
mance, we vary filtering from coarse- (no structural filtering, only
time-based filtering) to fine-grained (aggregating alerts across each
recipients’ list separately or across clients accessing each server
separately) (Figures 8, 9). Specifically, the aggregation parameter
changes from 50 recipients’ lists or servers down to 1. As before,
we measure detection in terms of the minimum number of infected
nodes that lead to raising a global alert. Also we consider three
NTW values – 1-, 2-, and 3- hours long for phishing and 25-, 50-,
and 100-sec long for waterhole.
Figure 8 shows that structural filtering improves detection of a
phishing attack by∼ 4x (difference between left and right end points
of each curve) over temporal filtering – by filtering out alert-FVs
from unrelated benign nodes that were active during the same NTW
as infected nodes. Interestingly, the size of a neighborhood window
does not considerably affect the detection when used along with the
most fine-grained structural filtering (treating each recipients’ list
individually) – 3-hour long NTWs results in only a ∼ 12% decrease
in the number of compromised nodes (i.e. time to detection). This
shows that there is substantial signal that structural filtering can
help extract from alert-FVs in smaller NTWs (and thus improve
Shape GD’s time to detection).
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Figure 9: (Waterhole attack) Comparing to pure time-based
NF, structural filtering algorithm improves Shape GD’s per-
formance by 3.75× – 5.8× by aggregating alerts on a server ba-
sis.
Structural filtering improves time to detect waterhole attacks as
well – by 5.82x, 4.07x, and 3.75x for 25-, 50-, 100-sec long windows
respectively. Interestingly, structural filtering requires Shape GD
to use longer NTWs than before – small NTWs (such as 6 seconds
from the last sub-section) no longer supply a sufficient number of
alert-FVs for Shape GD to operate robustly. Even though structural
filtering with a 25 second NTW improves detection by 5.82x over
temporal filtering with 25 second NTWs, the number of infected
nodes at detection time is 139.9 – higher than the 107 infected nodes
for temporal filtering with a 6 second NTW (Figure 7). Temporal
and structural filtering thus present different trade-offs between
detection time and work performed by GD – their relative perfor-
mance is affected by the rate at which true and false positive FVs
are generated.
6.4 Fragility of Count GD
A Count GD algorithm counts the number of alerts over a neighbor-
hood and compares to a threshold to detect malware. This threshold
scales linearly in the size of the neighborhood – we now experimen-
tally quantify the error Count GD can tolerate in phishing (Figure
15) and waterhole (Figure 10) settings. Note that the error in esti-
mating neighborhood size can be double sided – underestimates
(negative error) can make neighborhoods look like alert hotspots
and lead to false positives, while overestimates (positive error) can
lead to missed detections (i.e., lower true positives).
We run Count GD in the same setting as Shape GD when eval-
uating time-based NF (Section 6.2) – 30-sec long neighborhood
including 17,178 nodes (Figure 10) to model a waterhole attack and
1-hour long neighborhood time window (NTW) with 1086 nodes
(Figure 15 in Appendix F) to model phishing. We vary infection
probability (waterhole) and click rate in emails (phishing) such that
the number of infected nodes in a neighborhood changes from 0
to 55 (phishing) and from 0 to 500 (waterhole) in four increments –
note that in both scenarios, only a small fraction (5.5% and 2.9%) of
nodes per neighborhood get infected in the worst case.
In this setting, recall that the Shape GD has a maximum global
false positive rate of 1% and a true positive rate of 100% – and detects
malware when only 22 (phishing) and 200 (waterhole) nodes are
infected – for the same NTWs. When the same number of nodes
are infected, and for a similar detection performance, our experi-
ments show that the Count GD can only tolerate neighborhood size
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Figure 10: (Waterhole attack) An error in estimating neighbor-
hood size dramatically affects Count GD’s performance. It can
tolerate at most 0.1% underestimation errors and 13.8% overes-
timation errors to achieve comparable with Shape GD perfor-
mance.
estimation errors within a very narrow range – [-2%, 6.3%] (phish-
ing) and [-0.1%, 13.8%] (waterhole). A key takeaway here is that
underestimating a neighborhood’s size makes Count GD extremely
fragile (-2% in phishing and -0.1% for waterhole). On the other hand,
overestimating neighborhood sizes decreases true positives, and
this effect is catastrophic by the time the size estimates err by 17%
(phishing) and 17.5% (waterhole).
We comment that this effect can be important in practice. Given
the practical deployments where nodes get infected out of band (e.g.,
outside the corporate network), go out of range (with mobile de-
vices), or with dynamically defined neighborhoods based on actions
that can be missed (e.g. neighborhood defined by nodes that ‘open’
an email instead of only downloading it from amail server), the tight
margins on errors can render Count GD extremely unreliable. Even
with sophisticated size estimation algorithms, recall that the un-
derlying distributions that create these neighborhoods (email open
times, number of clients per server, etc) have sub-exponential heavy
tails [47] – such distributions typically result in poor parameter
estimates due to lack of higher moments, and thus, poorer statistical
concentrations of estimates about the true value [35]. Circling back,
we see that by eliminating this size dependence compared to Count
GD, our Shape GD provides a robust inference algorithm.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Building robust behavioral detectors is a long-standing problem. We
observe that attacks on enterprise networks induce a low-dimensional
structure on otherwise high-dimensional feature vectors, but this
structure is hard to exploit because the correlations are hard to pre-
dict. By analyzing alert feature vectors instead of alerts and filtering
the alert-FVs along neighborhood lines, we amplify the signal buried
in correlated feature vectors, and then use the notion of statistical
shape to classify neighborhoods without having to estimate the
expected number of benign and false positive FVs per neighborhood.
We note that both neighborhood-filtering and shape are complemen-
tary techniques that apply across a range of LDs or platforms – e.g.,
we have determined that Shape-GD also works well with n-grams
based LDs (instead of histograms) and on the Android platform (in
addition to Windows).
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Our methodology composes the traditional host-level malware
analysis methodology with trace-based simulations from real web
services (to overcome the lack of joint LD-GD datasets), and allow us
to run sensitivity analyses that will be precluded by using an actual
enterprise trace. We find that Shape-GD reduces the number of FPs
reported to deeper analyses by ∼100× and ∼200× when employing
time-based filtering only (for phishing and waterhole scenarios re-
spectively), while structural filtering reduces alert-FVs to ∼1000×
and ∼830× (Appendix E). Neighborhoods and their shape thus serve
as a new and effective lens for dimensionality reduction and signif-
icantly improve false positive rates of state-of-the-art behavioral
analyses. For example, LDs can operate at a higher false positive
rate in order to reduce false negatives and improve computation
efficiency.
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A HOW ACCURATE IS CLUSTERING FOR
GLOBAL MALWARE DETECTION?
While Count GD is fragile, clustering GDs are inaccurate in the
early stages of infection. This is why prior work [73] uses clustering
to (offline) identify high-priority incidents from security logs for
human analysis (instead of as an always-on GD) – this use case
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Figure 11: (ROC curve) True positive v. False positive curve
shows detection accuracy of the clustering-based malware
detector [73]. Its Area Under the Curve (AUC) parameter av-
eraged for 10 runs reaches only 48.3% and 47.4% in the case of
waterhole and phishing attacks respectively; such low AUC
value makes it unusable as a global detector.
is complementary to an always-on global detector. We quantify a
recent clustering GD’s [73] detection rate on our data set.
First, we reduce dimensionality of 390-dimensional FVs by pro-
jecting them on the top 10 PCA components, which retain 95.72%
of the data variance. Second, we use an adaptation of the K-means
clustering algorithm that does not require specifying the number of
clusters in advance [43, 70, 73]. Specifically, the algorithm consists
of the following three steps: (1) select a vector at random as the
first centroid and assign all vectors to this cluster; (2) find a vector
furthest away from its centroid (following Beehive [73], we use L1
distance) and make it a center of a new cluster, and reassign every
vector to the cluster with the closest centroid; and (3) repeat step
2 until no vector is further away from its centroid than half of the
average inter-cluster distance.
The evaluation settings of the clustering algorithm match exactly
the settings where Shape GD detects infected neighborhoods with
99% confidence. Specifically, the algorithm clusters the data that
we collected in a 17,178-node neighborhood under a waterhole
attack within 30 seconds and the data that we collected over an
hour-long session across 1086 nodes in a medium size corporate
network under a phishing attack (Section 5.3). As we have already
demonstrated (Section 6.2), Shape GD starts detecting malware
when 107 (waterhole attack) and 22 (phishing attack) nodes get
compromised (as in experiments for Figures 4 and 5).
Clustering does not fare well, and results look very similar for
both waterhole and phishing experiments. The clustering algorithm
partitions waterhole data set into 30 clusters. We observe three
large clusters that aggregate most of the benign FVs. However, the
algorithm fails to find small ’outlying’ clusters consisting of predom-
inantly malicious data. As for the phishing experiment, we observe
a similar picture: the algorithm forms slightly higher number of
clusters – 33 rather than 30 – and it identifies 4 densely populated
clusters. In both cases each cluster heavily mixes benign and ma-
licious data, hence the clustering approach suffers from poor dis-
criminative ability, i.e. it is unable to separate malicious and benign
samples.
Note the clustering algorithm enforces explicit ordering across
the clusters. That is, the algorithm forms a new cluster around an FV
that is furthest away from its cluster centroid. Thus, earlier a cluster
is created, the more suspicious it is. By design of the clustering
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algorithm, the clusters are subject to a deeper analysis in order of
their suspiciousness. Such an inherent ordering allows us to build a
receiver operating curve (Figure 11) and compute a typical metric
for a binary classifier – Area Under the Curve (AUC) by averaging
across 10 runs. The AUC reaches only 48.3% and 47.4% for waterhole
and phishing experiments respectively.
This experiment illustrates the failure of the traditional recipe of
dimensionality reduction plus clustering. There is a fundamental
reason for this – the neighborhoods we seek to detect are small com-
pared to the total number of nodes in the system. Optimization-based
algorithms that exploit density, including K-Means and related algo-
rithms, fail to detect small clusters in high dimensions, even under
dimensionality reduction. The reason is that the dimensionality re-
duction is either explicitly random (e.g., as in Johnson-Lindenstrauss
type approaches), or, if data-dependent (like PCA), it is effectively
independent of small clusters, as these represent very little of the
energy (the variance) of the overall data. Spectral clustering style al-
gorithms [26, 54, 68] are also notoriously unable to deal with highly
unbalanced sized clusters, and in particular, are unable to find small
clusters.
Shape GD also reduces dimensionality but does so after neigh-
borhood filtering. This amplifies the impact of small neighborhoods.
The combination of dimensionality reduction, small-neighborhood-
amplification, and then aggregation represents a novel approach to
this detection problem, and our experiments validate this intuition.
B LOCAL DETECTORS
Our first step is to establish a good local detector (LD) for desktop
systems running Windows OS. In particular, we choose system
call based LDs since the system call interface has visibility into an
app’s intercation with core OS components – file system, Windows
registry, network – and can thus capture signals relevant to malware
executions.
We experiment with an extensive set of system-call LDs – our
takeaway is that even the best LD we could construct operates at a
true- and false-positive ratio of 92.4%:6% and is not deployable by
itself (i.e., will create ∼30 false positives every 10 minutes without a
GD).
Each LD comprises of a feature extraction (FE) algorithm and
a machine learning (ML) classifier. Our FE algorithm partitions
the time-series of system calls into 1-sec chunks and represents
each chunk as a histogram (where each bin contains frequency
of a particular system call). Then it projects all feature vectors
onto 10-dimensional subspace spanned by top 10 principal com-
ponents generated by PCA algorithm. We choose ML classifiers
(used throughout prior work because these are computationally ef-
ficient to train) such as SVMs, random forest, k-Nearest Neighbors,
etc, and do not include complex alternatives such as artificial neural
networks or deep learning algorithms. We also deliberately avoid
handcrafted ML algorithms and hardcoded detection rules.
Figure 12 plots the true positive v. false positive rates (i.e. the
ROC curves) of the seven ML algorithms we evaluate. The area
under the ROC curve (AUC) is a quantitative measure of LD’s per-
formance: the larger the AUC, the more accurate the detector. We
specifically experiment with seven state-of-the-art ML algorithms:
random forest, 2-class SVM, kNN, decision trees, naive Bayes, and
their ensemble versions – boosted decision trees with AdaBoost
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Figure 12: (ROC curves) True positive v. False positive curves
shows detection accuracy of seven local detectors. Random
Forest outperforms all others; but has unacceptably high
false positive rate (above 10%) if one wants to achieve at least
95% true positive rate.
algorithm and Random SubSpace ensemble of kNN classifiers (Fig-
ure 12). We also evaluated 1-class SVM as an anomaly detector –
however, it yielded an extremely high FP rate and we exclude it from
further discussion. Overall, the random forest classifier worked best
– it has the highest AUC and we pick an operating point of 92.4%
true positives at a false positive rate of 6%.
C HOWMANY FVS DOES SHAPE GD NEED TO
MAKE ROBUST PREDICTIONS?
The number of FVs per neighborhood required by Shape-GD tomake
a robust prediction is a crucial parameter.With too few FVs produced
by a neighborhood, benign neighborhoods’ ShapeScore will have
high variance (i.e. benign distribution in Figure 3 becomes wide and
the gap between two distributions shrinks), leading to global false
positives and negatives. On the other hand, if neighborhoods are
large, their ShapeScores will be dominated by the large number of
benign FVs and thus lead to missed alerts (false negatives) especially
in the early stages of infection. Further, the number of alert-FVs
generated by a neighborhood in a deployed Shape-GD need to be
comparable to or larger than those used in training – hence, we
want to determine the smallest number of FVs Shape-GD needs to
make a robust prediction.
Figure 13 shows the sensitivity of Shape-GD to neighborhood size
(i.e., the number of FVs generated by nodes in a neighborhood during
training stage). We vary the number of FVs that a neighborhood
generates from 3,000 up to 30,000 FVs and average the results of
10 experiments. We present two metrics in Figure 13 – the red
curve plots the inter-class distance (between histograms of benign
and malicious neighborhoods from Figure 3), and the blue curve
plots intra-class distance (i.e. the width of the benign histogram).
Figure 13 shows that the red inter-class distance increases (and
blue intra-class variance decreases) quickly as neighborhood size
increases, and both curves flatten out once the neighborhoods start
generating more than 15,000 FVs.
This shows that (for our Windows programs dataset) neighbor-
hoods generating 15,000 FVs or more are a good choice to train
Shape GD because purely malicious or benign distributions stabilize
at this size. In real scenarios with mixtures of mostly benign and
a few malicious neighborhoods, the number of FVs will have to be
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Figure 13: Analysis of ShapeScore histogram parameters
when changing neighborhood size. The curves flatten out on
the right side from the operating point.
scaled up depending upon the timescale of attacks (hours for phish-
ing v. seconds for waterhole) and the number of nodes affected by
an attack (tens of nodes in enterprise email networks v. thousands
in a broader waterhole attack on the enterprise). In the phishing
and waterhole attack case studies in the paper, we use neighbor-
hoods of 1,086 and ∼17,000 nodes that produce 15k FVs and 100k
FVs respectively.
D COMPUTATION AND COMMUNICATION
COSTS OF SHAPE-GD
Local detectors. Generating a single FV, which is a 1-sec histogram
of system calls, on a local host is equivalent to performing 2,500
(system call frequency) direct table lookups on average and incre-
menting corresponding counters. Projection on a PCA basis requires
computing 10 dot products. Finally, running an LD, which is Ran-
dom Forest in our case, results in performing 330 scalar comparisons
on average. At 1 second per FV, the overheads of such an LD are
negligible.
Data transfer. Each FV is composed of 10 floating point numbers
(40 bytes total if assuming single precision format). In the phishing
experiment 1086 hosts transfer (in aggregate) ∼ 40KB/sec; data
transfer rate in waterhole setting is a little bit higher: ∼ 4, 450
hosts transfer (in aggregate) ∼ 174KB/sec . In both cases we assume
Shape GD using pure time-based filtering with 1 hour and 6 sec
neighborhood time windows respectively.
If Shape GD employs structural filtering on top of the time-based
one, then data transfer depends on the number of emails floating in
a network or on the number of servers. In both cases, data transfer
scales linearly with the number of emails and servers. When apply-
ing the most fine-grained structural filtering in our experiments, the
nodes susceptible to phishing attacks transfer ∼ 4KB/sec per email
and the nodes susceptible to waterhole attacks send ∼ 40KB/sec
per server when using 1 hour and 25 sec neighborhood windows
respectively.
Server computations.After receiving a batch of alert-FVs, Shape
GD performs lightweight computations. Overhead of binning scales
linearly with the number of alert-FVs in a batch; each binning op-
eration is a direct table lookup together with counter increment.
Calculating ShapeScore, which is Wasserstein distance, results in a
sequence of addition operations, whose total number is equal to the
dimensionality of FVs, which is 10, multiplied by the number of bins,
which is 50. To summarize, Shape GD’s computational requirements
are fairly light-weight.
E DISCUSSION
Global FPs vs LD FPs. As remarked in the Introduction, an FP of
1% at the global level means that we will see one alert every 100 -
300 hours (for the phishing scenario) and 100 seconds (for waterhole
scenario the neighborhood time window slides by 1 second). This
reduces work to be performed by the deeper, second-level analysis
considerably.
Specifically, LDs operating at 6% false positive rate generate 23.5M
– 70M FPs within 100–300 hours time interval in a network of 1086
nodes (phishing) and 300K alerts within every 100 sec interval where
neighborhoods include ∼50K nodes on average (waterhole). Shape
GD filters these alerts. When using 1–3 hours (phishing) and 6
sec (waterhole) time-based neighborhood filtering, Shape GD will
report to a system running a deeper analysis approximately 234.5K
– 703.7K FPs raised by LDs (phishing) and approximately 1.4K FPs
(waterhole). Adding structural filtering brings these numbers down
to 21.6K – 64.8K FPs (phishing) and 360 FPs (waterhole).
Compared to a neighborhood of LDs, Shape GD thus reduces the
number of FPs reported to deeper analyses by ∼100× and ∼200×
when employing time-based filtering only (for phishing and wa-
terhole scenarios respectively), while structural filtering reduces
alert-FVs for deeper analysis to ∼1000× and ∼830×. In both sce-
narios, analysts can choose to reduce number of alert-FVs to be
analyzed by sliding neighborhood windows by a larger interval;
however, this will increase the time to detect malware infection.
Shape property across LDs and platforms. Shape-GD relies on
conditional separability of FPs and TPs, and we use only one LD
type for evaluation – a system call histogram-based LD. However,
we have experimentally determined that FPs and TPs are separable
for other LD types as well – an n-gram-based LD [41] and an LD
that uses VirusTotal [18] reports for malware detection [52]. Further,
we can classify malicious neighborhoods on the Android platform –
using malware binaries obtained from the NCSU dataset and con-
tagio dump website, and using benign applications that we drive
using real human user input – in addition to the Windows setup
that we describe here. We have left out the details due to lack of
space but can produce an anonymous report if requested.
Though the local detectors we built have a 6% FP rate, Shape-GD
can work well work with better LDs. Shape-GD only requires LD’s
FPs and TPs to be separable and to be able to aggregate enough
alert-FVs across the nodes within a neighborhood. We deliberately
do not consider rule-based LDs that are commonly used within
enterprise networks because, even though their FP rate is very low,
they suffer from a high false negative rate, and they can be easily
evaded with simple malware transformations.
Performance Overheads. Recall that Shape GD requires only alert
FVs – this leads to a two-fold dimensionality reduction when send-
ing data from individual LDs to the GD. First, the FVs are low-
dimensional (here, 10-dimensional vectors). Second, only alert FVs
are needed – this leads to a 16-fold reduction in data (roughly only
6% of the FVs lead to alerts). Further, the Shape GD is a batch pro-
cessing algorithm, thus, the individual nodes can batch their data
at coarse time-scales (e.g. once every NTW) and send the data to
the Shape GD. Finally, it does not matter even if some batches are
lost/missed; recall that the Shape GD is robust to precisely this type
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Figure 14: (Overview) Shape-GD machine learning pipeline.
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Figure 15: (Phishing attack) An error in estimating neighbor-
hood size dramatically affects Count GD’s performance. It can
tolerate at most 2% underestimation errors and 6.3% overesti-
mation errors to achieve comparable with Shape GD perfor-
mance.
of noise. Appendix A discusses overheads in more depth but the
key takeaway is that Shape GD has low overheads – each LD can
use simple dot products and scalar comparisons to implement PCA
and Random Forests, the total incoming bandwidth to the Shape GD
server ranges from 40KBps to 174KBps for phishing and waterhole
respectively, and the server only needs to bin data (into 50 bins) and
compute Wasserstein distance (add 10 counters in each bin).
Detailed Shape-GD Pipeline. As an extension to the description
in Section 4, Figure 14 shows the detailed machine learning pipeline
for extracting one neighborhood’s shape into a ShapeScore.
F HOW FRAGILE IS COUNT GD TO ERRORS
IN ESTIMATING NEIGHBORHOOD SIZE?
(PHISHING)
Due to space considerations, we have placed the results for Count
GD’s fragility to mis-estimated neighborhood sizes in the appendix
in Figure 15. The key trends are similar to waterhole attack presented
in the main paper – even a slight under- or over-estimate of dynamic
neighborhoods’ sizes can yield completely inaccurate results.
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